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Background: Fast-flux is a technique malicious ac-
tors use for resilient malware communications. In
this paper, domain parking is the practice of assign-
ing a nonsense location to an unused fully-qualified
domain name (FQDN) to keep it ready for “live”
use. Many papers use “parking” to mean typosquat-
ting for ad revenue. However, we use the original
meaning, which was relevant because it is a poten-
tially confounding behavior for detection of fast-flux.
Internet-wide fast-flux networks and the extent to
which domain parking confounds fast-flux detection
have not been publicly measured at scale.
Aim: Demonstrate a repeatable method for open-
source measurement of fast-flux and domain park-
ing, and measure representative trends over 5 years.
Method: Our data source is a large passive-DNS col-
lection. We use an open-source implementation that
identifies suspicious associations between FQDNs,
IP addresses, and ASNs as graphs. We detect park-
ing via a simple time-series of whether a FQDN ad-
vertises itself on IETF-reserved private IP space and
public IP space alternately. Whitelisting domains
that use private IP space for encoding non-DNS re-
sponses (e.g. blacklist distributors) is necessary.
Results: Fast-flux is common; usual daily values
are 10M IP addresses and 20M FQDNs. Domain
parking, in our sense, is uncommon (94,000 unique
FQDNs total) and does not interfere with fast-
flux detection. Our open-source tool works well at
internet-scale.
Discussion: Real-time detection of fast-flux net-
works could help defenders better interrupt them.
With our implementation, a resolver could poten-
tially block name resolutions that would add to a
known flux network if completed, preventing even
the first connection. Parking is a poor indicator of
malicious activity.
1 Introduction
Fast-flux service networks were first reported in
2007, identified as “a network of compromised com-
puter systems with public DNS records that are con-
stantly changing, in some cases every few minutes”
[25, §1]. Criminals use the technique to “evade iden-
tification and to frustrate law enforcement and anti-
crime efforts aimed at locating and shutting down
web sites” that are used for abuse or illegal purposes
[13, p. 2].
Despite this long history, and a variety of pub-
lications on detecting fast flux, there is no main-
tained, open-source tool that can detect it at
scale. The Honeynet Project’s own tool for the
purpose, Tracker (http://honeynet.org/project/
Tracker), has a defunct homepage. Tools from the
time, such as ATLAS [20] and FluXOR [21], han-
dle on the order of 400 domains. Our tool, Analysis
Pipeline, handles networks on the order of 1 million
fully-qualified domain names (FQDN, hereafter sim-
ply “domain” if the usage is unambiguous). Pipeline
simultaneously tracks other network behavior, such
as network flow records. Therefore Pipeline can de-
tect when a host connects to an IP address in the
fast-flux network in near-real time, for example.
We also measure a phenomenon mentioned but
not measured in some older fast-flux detection pa-
pers: domain name parking. When a domain is
parked on an IP address, the IP address to which
the domain resolves is inactive or otherwise not
controlled by the domain owner. Parking is com-
mon practice when a user first registers an effective
second-level domain (eSLD) – the registrar supplies
a nonsense IP address to prevents DNS errors. How-
ever, this parking pattern is distinctive and simple.
We look for other, suspicious patterns.
There are multiple distinct senses of the term “do-
main parking,” and our topic is not synonymous
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with any other study of which we are aware. Domain
parking on private IP address space is, however, a
relatively old phenomenon; it is mentioned in some
fast-flux identification algorithm studies as an obsta-
cle [35, 14]. This older usage of “domain parking” is
our topic of study We use domain parking on private
IP address space to differentiate it from the newer
usage [2, 34] that more accurately is domain parking
on routeable IP addresses for advertisement revenue
generation.
Two of the first studies on parking domains for il-
licit ad revenue find large-scale use of 4 million to 8
million domains [2, 34]. However, from the authors’
description this appears to be more like typosquat-
ting (as described in Szurdi et. al. [31]) than res-
olution error suppression. We are not studying ty-
posquatting or skimming ad revenue off user typos.
Domain parking of the sort we study is a strategy for
suppressing domain resolution errors, likely used to
keep command and control infrastructure stealthy.
The domain name system permits a variety of dif-
ferent resiliency mechanisms for distributed archi-
tectures. Often these have legitimate uses, but ma-
licious actors are equally able to adopt successful
techniques. Fast-flux and domain parking of private
IP space are both candidates for such abuse. ICANN
responded to the security concerns from fast-flux
networks in 2009 by stating there would be no policy
response [15, p. 10]. Thus, of the six mitigation op-
tions outlined in the original Honeynet analysis, five
are unlikely or inconsistently applied because they
can only be enacted by ISPs or Registrars. The last,
“passive DNS harvesting/monitoring to identify A
or NS records advertised” as part of fast-flux net-
works [25, §10], is the approach we implement with
Analysis Pipeline. Our detection method is inspired
by the Mannheim score [12].
We find a mixture of positive and negative results.
On one hand, our measurement of fast-flux networks
confirms our hypothesis that this behavior remained
prevalent. As one negative example, domain park-
ing on private IP address space is not worth much
concern, for fast-flux network detection or otherwise.
Negative results are important and useful in shap-
ing future work. Publication bias has been a docu-
mented concern in medical literature for 30 years [8].
Despite this attention, publication of negative re-
sults has generally dwindled across disciplines. The
relative publication frequency of positive results over
negative results grew by 22% from 1990 to 2007 [9].
We expect such publication bias away from negative
results is a contributing factor to why there seems
to be no public measurement of this phenomenon.
Section 2 discusses the common elements of the
method between our parking and fast flux measure-
ments, which primarily is the passive DNS data
source and our open-source tool Analysis Pipeline.
We present our measurement method for FQDNs
that exhibit parking on private IP address space
in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 describes our fast-flux
measurement methods. Section 3 presents the full
results. Section 4 interprets and discusses these re-
sults.
2 Method
Our measurements of domain parking of private IP
address space and fast-flux networks use different
algorithms over the same data set and implemented
using the same open-source tool. We describe the
common measurement period, data, and tool here.
The methods specific to each parking and fast-flux
measurement are described in the following subsec-
tions.
We measure activity during over five years of pas-
sive DNS data, from January 1, 2012 to June 30,
2017. The data source, the Security Information
Exchange (SIE), has been demonstrated to be rea-
sonably representative of the global Internet with
a small North American collection bias [29]. This
is high-volume passive DNS data, as well as be-
ing representative. Each month, the unique FQDNs
observed range between 550 million and 1 billion.
With the relatively small and stable zone .edu, the
data source is sufficiently represetative to recon-
struct 93% of the zone in five weeks [27].
We use our own data filtering and packing tools,
independent from the SIE database. About 35-40
GB of data is ingested daily in compressed nmsgtool
format [10], including source DNS server and pre-
cise time range the response was valid. Unique re-
source record sets (RRsets) are extracted for each
24-hour day, with a cutoff of 0000 UTC. We store
just the fields for rname, TTL, type, and rdata.
The nmsg data canonicalizes rdata, so this field
is sorted set of all rdata in a single DNS message
for a rname,type,class triple. The rname field is
label-wise reversed, so www.example.com becomes
com.example.www; this makes sorting and lookup
easier, as the TLD is usually a more important
key. The RRsets are then simply sorted and unique
RRsets stored per day. When compressed with stan-
dard tools such as bzip or gzip, this ASCII storage
format takes about 5 GB per day.
The rationale for this storage method is similar
to that for why SiLK, a netflow analysis tool suite,
stores flow in time-sorted, partitioned flat files via
the file system rather than in a database [32]. We are
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interested in long trends, or retrospective analysis of
poorly understood past events. This is different from
the use case of many passive DNS users, who are
looking for keywords indicating abuse of particular
brand names. Our storage format provides details on
what domains resolved to on particular days. This
allows us to see interleaving changes in domain-IP
mappings and large gaps of inactivity that are not
possible in a database that only stores first- and last-
seen times. Our parking measurement, in particular,
requires such granularity.
A final benefit of this time-partitioned storage for-
mat is that it is highly parallelizable. Using an
HDFS cluster, queries parallelize naturally with each
node processing a day. We find that using a database
can speed our analysis, especially of fast-flux. How-
ever, we parallelize even the database, loading each
daily RRset file and then operating over it indepen-
dently. The overhead of managing a database for all
five years of data is superfluous.
Both parking and fast-flux measurements make
use of context data to enrich IP addresses. Most
importantly, we associate IP addresses with the au-
tonomous system which is advertising it on the rel-
evant day. Autonomous System Number (ASN) at-
tribution is derived from the RouteViews [23] and
RIPE NCC RIS [22] data. All ASN data are freely
available online [3] under folders for the respective
dates. The baseline mapping of ASNs across all IP
space uses the open-source SiLK [5] tools for pre-
fix maps and IP sets [32]. Strictly, we count unique
routing profiles, not unique ASNs. If an IP address
is dual-homed or the global BGP otherwise has con-
sensus that two last-hop ASNs are viable, we mark
that IP address with both ASNs. Since our goal is
to identify when IP addresses are routed differently
to identify stewardship changes, this interpretation
is sensible. The geolocation data we use is the public
MaxMind GeoLite2 [18].
We relate our analysis algorithms as Analysis
Pipeline [24] configuration files. Pipeline is one of
the open-source tools associated with SiLK [5]. It
is a real-time traffic analyzer that works on IPFIX
and network flow records. Pipeline is a Network Be-
havior Analyzer subtype of an Intrusion Detection
System in NIST terminology [26]. As a sort of IDS,
Pipeline can run in real time on a network to dy-
namically detect fast-flux or parking domains and
then dynamically add them to a list to watch or
block. Thus, with the configurations here and the
published SiLK tools, our measurements are readily
reproducible in the sense of Feitelson [11], where to
reproduce means in a different setting with similar
artifacts.




--alert -log -file =~/ AlertLog.txt \
--aux -alert -file =~/ AuxLog.txt \
--ipfix \
--time -is -clock \
--configuration =~/ parking.conf \
--name -files input_files_list
Algorithm 1 is an example of how to execute
Pipeline. Specifically it calls our parking measure-
ment configuration, listed later in Algorithm 2. It
reads DNS records encoded in the standard IPFIX
format [6]. A sample python script to convert DNS
records from CSV format to IPFIX is available in the
pyfixbuf documentation [4]. Passive DNS data can
also be converted to CSV or IPFIX directly using
the nmsg python bindings [10].
In addition to rote results, we perform some sim-
ple summary and context operations. The main
summary is based on the effective second level do-
main (eSLD) of the parked domains. The eSLD of
www.example.com is simply the SLD example.com;
however, the eSLD of www.example.co.uk includes
a third label: example.co.uk. To identify eS-
LDs we use the Mozilla public suffix list (effec-
tive_tld_names.dat).
The main context-enrichment operation is to in-
tersect parked domains and their publicly-routable
IP addresses with fast-flux domains and IP ad-
dresses. The intersection is simple set intersection
on the domain names. We do not report time slices
of the intersection, simply the intersection between
the union of all domains exhibiting parking behav-
ior and the union of all fast-flux domains. We also
summarize to eSLD and repeat the intersection.
For some context about malicious intent of park-
ing and fast flux, we associate each set of domains
with lists of malicious domains. While we have ex-
pressed our doubts about the soundness of evaluat-
ing an approach by comparing it to blacklists [19], we
have mitigated this error by including as many lists
as possible (over 100) and limiting our assumptions
of the information provided by this comparison.
We perform blacklist comparisons within 6-month
blocks. All blacklist entries over the whole timespan
are unioned, and that set is intersected with all do-
mains exhibiting the behavior of interset at any time
during the timespan. This mitigates the possibility
that it takes some time to identify and blacklist a
malicious domain. It has proven logistically imprac-
tical to provide a sliding window for blacklist de-
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tection. But 6-month windows are pretty broad, as
many malicious behaviors are consistently detected
and vendors list names within a few hours. At this
wide window, we already risk false-positives due to
IP-address churn or other exogenous factors over-
whelming true blacklist associations. We happen to
have more IP-address based blacklists than domain-
based ones; it is unclear whether this overestimates
IP-address participation in blacklists or underesti-
mates domain names, if either.
2.1 Parking Detection
We measure domain parking on private IP address
space straightforwardly. The algorithm is summa-
rized as follows; we expand the description through
the rest of the section. First, we find all DNS IPv4-
answer RRsets that refer to private address space
to acquire a set of possible domains. We remove
whitelisted domains that we have found to use pri-
vate address space as an information carrier for other
services. For all domains that remain after this sub-
traction, we find all their DNS RRsets for that day
and a window three weeks into the future. These
three-week time series are examined for transitions
from public to private IP-space. We repeat this al-
gorithm for each day in the five-year measurement
period, evaluating 1807 three-week windows.
Our first step is to extract or mark all RRsets that
contain a private IP address in the rdata. Private
IP address space is exactly those addresses listed
in Table 1. These blocks are selected because they
are special-purpose assignments that RFC 6890 lists
as either not forwardable by routers or not global,
meaning only forwardable in specified administrative
zones [7].
This provides a set of rname data that have been
associated with a private IP address. Most are
not parking. Private IP space used to encode var-
ious kinds of non-location data, such as responses
to lookups on DNSBLs [17]. SURBL provides a
good example of how and why their service does
this [30]. Seeded by lists of threat intelligence and
blacklist providers such as intel.criticalstack.
com, and refined through human expert analysis, we
whitelist 165 DNS zones that consistently encode
non-location data.
The process so far yields a list of RRsets with
rdata in private IP space whose rname zones do
not have a whitelisted, known use. We next find
all RRsets with the same rname values and pub-
licly routeable IP addresses within 21 days. These
domains transitioned between private and routeable















Table 1: Private IP address space
We define FQDNs that exhibit such a transition as
demonstrating parking behavior on private IP ad-
dress space during our observation period.
In order to cover the 5-year time period, we com-
pute this rather simple algorithm over 1800 times.
For each day’s set of unique RRsets, we extract the
domains mapping to private IP address space, re-
move whitelisted zones, and expand to those also
mapping to a public address at some time within
three weeks.
For each FQDN that has exhibited parking behav-
ior, we can generate a course-grained time series of
the behavior to categorize what occurred. Table 2
demonstrates some sample behavioral groupings. P
indicates a day where the only rdata was in private
IP address space, G indicates a day where the only
rdata was in globally routeable IP address space,
and X indicates a day where both address types were
observed, indicating a day a change between parking
and active occurred.
The configuration listed in Algorithm 2 runs our
method in Pipeline. The SiLK IPset “priv.set” con-
tains exactly the address blocks listed in Table 1.
2.2 Method: Fast-flux
Our fast-flux detection algorithm implements prior
work, such as the Mannheim score [12]. The main
novelty of our work is the scale and duration of our
measurement and the use of open-source tools. De-
tection algorithms were sufficiently well-studied in
2010, and the same concept holds for detection of
fast-flux today.
The basis of our fast-flux detection algorithm is
that a legitimate administrator owns or rents their
infrastructure in a relatively small number of places.
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January: 1-8 9-16 17-24 25-31
Activation on Jan 19 PPPPPPPP PPPPPPPP PPXGGGGG GGGGGGG
Deactivation on Jan 19 GGGGGGGG GGGGGGGG GGXPPPPP PPPPPPP
alextringham.com GGGGGGGG GGGGGGGG GGGGXPPX PXPXPPP
proxyie.cn GGXXXXXX GGGXGXGG GGPGGXGX XGGGXGX
bnlv.homeip.net GGGGGPGG GGGGGGGG PGPPGGGG GGGGPGG
Table 2: Example parking behavior patterns per domain, January 2014. G := only globally routeable IPs
observed that day. P := only privately reserved IPs observed. X := both observed on same day.
Algorithm 2 Parking detection in Pipeline
FILTER emptyDomainNames




dnsQName domainsWithNoIP 1 DAY
END INTERNAL FILTER
FILTER unparked
dnsQName IN LIST domainsWithNoIP









We perform some pilot studies on January 2016 to
get a sense of what counts as small. We represent
fast-flux networks as graphs of each of three kinds of
resource: IP addresses, ASN, and FQDN. The intu-
ition is that shared hosting may have 10,000 domains
on a single IP, and if changes to another IP address it
is likely one the hosting provider owns. The network
identifiers cluster when one or another resource is ad-
vertised on a new resource. If two domains both map
to 192.168.0.1, and then one is changed to 10.0.1.1,
then our algorithm considers both IP addresses as
well as both domains to be part of a cluster. The
information cluster would also include any domains
that had previously mapped to 10.0.1.1 within the
time frame, and any IP addresses they had been
mapped to, and so on. For our example, imagine
this linking brings in 20 more domains, all on the
16 IP addresses in 172.16.0.32/28. However, the AS
for all 18 IP addresses is AS112. We do not consider
this a fast-flux network, because all the resources are
only related to one AS. They are probably related
because of a the AS owner doing regular mainte-
Algorithm 3 Fast-flux detection in Pipeline
PMAP asn "$today.ip2asn.pmap"
FILTER fluxwhitelist















nance or load balancing, not fast flux. This example
helps show why ASN is needed, rather than relying
on CIDR block.
Our results are run with the conservative thresh-
olds that a graph must contain 500 unique IPs, 23
ASNs, and 667 FQDNs to be marked fast flux. We
also whitelist any IP addresses in our private IP ad-
dress space (Table 1) and a FQDN whitelist that
created from the Alexa most popular domains list.
Resources on these whitelists will not be added to a
graph, and so can never be marked fast flux.
The FQDN whitelist captures more stability than
naïvely using the Alexa top X. For a given day, we
find all names in the Alexa top 24,000 on 330 of the
past 365 days. The whitelist functions as a wild-
card, not as an FQDN perfect match. So if exam-
ple.com is on the whitelist, *.example.com will not
be watched for fast flux. For this reason, we remove
any effective TLDs on the Mozilla public suffix list
(version on June 15, 2017), of which there are rou-
tinely between 50-100 on the Alexa list. We also re-
move any well-known dynamic DNS providers from
the whitelist. Finally, we make sure that no domains
have subdomains on the list; this interferes with the
wildcard function of pipeline whitelists. The aver-
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Figure 1: Statistics on changes between Alexa-based whitelists, calculated on the pairwise differences between
lists. Changes includes additions and removals. Each value on the X-axis is a color-based box-and-whisker
plot representing the distribution of changes for all pairwise sets of lists that many days apart.
age size of the whitelist is 14,847. The minimum is
13,780 (March 7, 2017); the maximum size is 15,946
(April 4, 2013). Even with this algorithm designed
for some stability, there significant change, which
warrants using a new list each day. Figure 1 dis-
plays the distribution of whitelist-entry changes cal-
culated pairwise between all 1492 lists. The first day
we have Alexa data available is April 1, 2012, so the
first day a composite whitelist is possible is April
1, 2013. We use this April 1, 2013 list for any flux
measurements before that date.
We selected a relatively high threshold (500-23-
667) after exploratory analysis demonstrated some
clearly legitimate uses that exceeded our initial 5-5-5
threshold. Before implementing the Alexa whitelist,
we also found Tumblr, as 616 IPs, 10 ASNs, and
10,658,458 FQDNs. But not every large network
like this is handled by a whitelist. For example,
the network signature 216 IPs, 19 ASNs, 2,341,876
FQDNs is not in fact a fast-flux network, but Tek-
blue, an ad tracking company. But, because Tek-
blue is an ad tracker, it does not appear on our
Alexa whitelist, on any day. Ampproject.net also
consistently produced huge fast-flux-like clusters—
such as 755 IPs, 15 ASNs, 533,082 FQDNs and 671
IPs, 12 ASNs, 534,956 FQDNS—but is never on
our whitelist. These are evidence for increasing our
ASNs threshold. We also find evidence to increase
our FQDN threshold. The graph 9,051 IPs, 102
ASNs, 63 FQDNs is Akamai. NTP device pools also
produce quite strange signatures, such as 2100 IPs,
845 ASNs, 122 FQDNs and 2,507 IPs, 910 ASNs,
267 FQDNs.
We did a sample run at 500-23-667 to check re-
sults. The graph with the fewest ASNs passing
these thresholds was 27; its domains often have a
suspicious pattern that appears machine-generated.
There are some names that look human-generated;
however, they may be compromised. At the least,
it is not something to obviously exclude by increas-
ing the thresholds. The test run reduced the re-
sults from 513 (with 5-5-5 thresholds) to 196 dis-
tinct, non-overlapping flux networks. But these 196
still capture almost all of the IP addresses from the
513; 99.7% of the unique IP addresses across flux
networks remain in the results with the increased
threshold. Therefore, while our thresholds are con-
servatively high, we still find significant malicious
activity while reducing obvious false positives.
One may wonder if publishing such a detec-
tion threshold would benefit adversaries more than
defenders. However, forcing adversaries to keep
smaller, disjoint networks would reduce their relia-
bility and increase their management effort. Adver-
saries would no longer be able to use any resource
if its FQDN or IP is associated with a known, live
flux network. Pipeline can issue such alerts in real
time, as new resources are seen and added to known
networks. Potentially, this means many communica-
tions can be blocked at the first instance, preventing
even one use of the FQDN or IP if it is added to a
known flux network. Such before-first-use blocking
is recommended by Spring [28] as necessary to keep
adversaries from profiting.
Analysis Pipeline (version 5.0 and later) includes
a primitive data element for fast-flux networks [24].
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FQDNs intersection of flux of park
2012-1 14609 0.0008 0.2069
2012-2 12103 0.0009 0.0286
2013-1 10930 0.0006 0.1990
2013-2 11662 0.0006 0.1126
2014-1 11106 0.0006 0.1362
2014-2 30346 0.0007 0.0714
2015-1 61259 0.0010 0.1756
2015-2 40824 0.0008 0.0800
2016-1 32687 0.0004 0.0934
2016-2 46291 0.0004 0.1125
2017-1 56758 0.0006 0.0458
Table 4: Half-yearly intersections of domains ex-
hibiting parking and fast-flux networks. Values
range [0,1].
IPs intersection of flux of park
2012-1 523056 0.0147 0.9127
2012-2 2565808 0.0717 0.8847
2013-1 220651 0.0052 0.8934
2013-2 257741 0.0083 0.8644
2014-1 364870 0.0127 0.9415
2014-2 730484 0.0149 0.9421
2015-1 478327 0.0086 0.9100
2015-2 557457 0.0109 0.8911
2016-1 1567197 0.0268 0.9039
2016-2 1562149 0.0169 0.7736
2017-1 837599 0.0141 0.7640
Table 5: Half-yearly intersections of IP addresses
exhibiting parking and fast-flux networks. Values
range [0,1].
Pipeline builds a connected graph of ASN, FQDN,
IP address tuples. If the connected graph passes a
threshold for all three resources, that graph is con-
sidered to be a fast flux network. Algorithm 3 is
the Pipeline configuration that implements our de-
tection algorithm. The alerts can be configured to
report the whole connected graph, or just lists of do-
mains or IP addresses. Algorithm 4 shows how to
use such output lists.
3 Results
Fast-flux networks do not overlap much with re-
sources exhibiting parking. Neither fast-flux nor
parking overlap much with blacklisted resources.
Parking behavior is present, but small in the scheme
of the global internet. Fast-flux networks, on the
other hand, appear to make use of a large number
of internet resources.
Figure 2 plots the number of unique FQDNs and
effective SLDs used each day for parking. Our park-
ing algorithm uses a 3-week window to detect park-
ing, which has an effect of smoothing out the day-
to-day changes. The median FQDNs parking on a
given day is 13,300, in a median of 4,750 eSLDs.
Figure 3 captures the fact that fast-flux networks
have a much bigger footprint. Many days have over
10,000,000 IPs and 20,000,000 FQDNs involved in
fast-flux.
Table 4 reports the overlap between fast-flux and
parking FQDNs detected in each half-year. Ta-
ble 5 reports the analogous overlap for IP addresses.
Since there are fewer resources that evidence park-
ing, these intersections make up a larger share of
parking than of fast flux.
Given the conservative (i.e., large) definition of
flux network size we set, it is unlikely these collec-
tions of internet resources have a benign purpose.
Our initial pilot study (using 5-5-5 as a threshold)
contained common internet services such as ad net-
works, content distribution networks, and the NTP
servers. The threshold of 500-23-667 excludes such
benign services, based on our expert analysis of the
results.
Despite the fact we do not have a benign explana-
tion for this behaviour, as Figure 4 and Figure 5
demonstrate, few IP addresses that have partici-
pated in a fast-flux network are on any blacklists.
The median monthly blacklist intersections range
between 100,000 and 400,000; roughly 4-8% of the
flux networks. The exception seems to be overlap
during 2017 between flux networks and FQDN black-
lists.
Parking, likewise, is uncommonly blacklisted. Ta-
ble 3 displays the results for both FQDNs and live IP
addresses associated with parking behavior. Because
so few domains park, the contribution of parking to
blacklists is negligible. However, parking is also not
a reliable indicator of blacklist membership. Fewer
than 2% of domains and between 5-10% of IPs that
exhibit parking end up on blacklists.
Our results for January 2014 are available
for download (see http://www.cert.org/downloads/
name-parking-patterns-certcc-2014-57.txt) in the
format of a domain name followed by the behavior
pattern encoded as in Table 2.
FQDNs from the Alexa top 100 occasionally were
found on our parking list [1]. We manually removed
about 30 Alexa top 100 domains from the results
each period. The root cause for these anomalous
DNS responses is not known.
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FQDNs % lists % parking IPs % lists % parking
2012-1 3033 0.0469 4.2959 87069 0.2079 14.1214
2012-2 2513 0.0272 0.5929 85853 0.2525 2.5345
2013-1 1746 0.0139 3.1782 26479 0.0941 10.1526
2013-2 4439 0.0883 4.2842 13300 0.1473 4.1119
2014-1 2005 0.0723 2.4587 33654 0.1342 8.4516
2014-2 6596 0.0631 1.5530 51061 0.1702 5.7200
2015-1 5616 0.0459 1.6101 47535 0.1565 8.6189
2015-2 8339 0.0639 1.6332 49728 0.2010 7.3737
2016-1 6802 0.0279 1.9426 91716 0.2647 4.9624
2016-2 4295 0.0164 1.0442 100620 0.3417 4.5519
2017-1 5315 0.0136 0.4292 64859 0.1462 10.332























































































































































































Domains exhibiting parking behavior: 2012 to 2017
unique FQDNs
unique SLDs
Figure 2: Three-week rolling window of unique domains and eSLDs exhibiting parking behavior from begin-
ning of 2012 to April 2017.
Some parking domains used dynamic DNS ser-
vices; however, usage is minimal. We compared the
results to a list of 71 known dynamic DNS providers.
The bulk were hosted on two providers: dyndns.org
or on some name affiliated with no-ip. These are
the two biggest providers, so this distribution is ex-
pected based on market share.
4 Conclusions
We shall discuss our fast-flux results first, and then
our parking results.
Fast-flux networks remain remarkably common 10
years after first reported use by malicious actors.
The lack of intersection with blacklists despite the
obviously suspicious nature of this behavior is es-
pecially noteworthy. We suspect that fast-flux net-
works are used for intermediary malicious behavior,
such as providing clandestine communication to al-
ready infected hosts. It is also possible that blacklist
vendors do not bother to list something that they
know will change within a very short interval. We
also have not ruled out all possible alternative in-
terpretations; for example, peer-to-peer networks.
However, if this were the case, we would still expect
our flux results to be a superset of malicious flux
networks. Excessive poor detection precision would
decrease the number of flux resources on blacklists,
but it does not explain why so few of our blacklist
entries are in flux networks.
We have designed our method to capture non-
benign fast-flux networks. Our first attempt at set-
ting thresholds captured many recognizable, legit-
imate internet services. However, as described in
Section 2.2, we eliminated all obvious and large false
positives. Our observation is limited by the data
source. However, again, this has a known bias, and
it is known to be comprehensive. We do not make
any claims that we can project our observations onto
the parts of the internet we do not observed. How-
ever, the absolute numbers of resources participating
in fast-flux we detect are quite large. We do not need
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Figure 3: Total unique network resources of different types associated with fast-flux networks every day.











































01/12 01/13 01/14 01/15 01/16 01/17
Flux IPs on blacklists per month
Figure 4: Summary statistics fast-flux–blacklist intersection. Each day’s flux from January through June
2013 is intersected with all 1H2013 blacklist data, for example, and the daily intersections are summarized
in monthly box plots. The whisker length is 1.5 times the inter-quartile range (IQR).
to project onto a target population. The measure-
ment as-is finds over 100 million IPs and FQDNs
some days in 2017. We have high confidence that
few of these resources are participating for benign
reasons. Even in the unlikely event that the rest of
the internet sees no other unique resources partici-
pating in fast-flux, these values are worrisome.
As demonstrated repeatedly, the contents of in-
dividual blacklists rarely overlap [19, 16, 33]. One
plausible explanation for this disjointedness is that
blacklists track a lot of ephemeral IP addresses.
However, if fast-flux would have a statistical impact
on this disjointedness, it would need to represent
more than 1% of blacklist identifiers: as we found in
this study.
Our leading interpretation of the fact that our
fast-flux results are mutually disjoint with the black-
lists we have access to is the following. None of the
blacklists are tracking fast-flux. This interpretation
is consistent with prior interpretation of the black-
list disjointedness generally, which is that each list is
good, but very precise about what it is following and
from what sensor vantage [19]. This interpretation
is strengthened by the long observation time, over
many years, and the consistency of both the size of
the fast-flux networks and the lack of blacklist over-
lap during that time.
Algorithm 4 is an example of how the results from
fast-flux measurement can be applied to continuous
network situational awareness. We do not report an
evaluation on a live network due to data access and
publication issues; however, we provide the configu-
ration so that network operators can apply it consis-
tently as a test and compare results privately. The
result would be that once enough domain-IP pairs
are looked up to form a fast-flux network, one alerts
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01/12 01/13 01/14 01/15 01/16 01/17
Flux FQDNs on blacklists per month
Figure 5: Summary statistics fast-flux–blacklist intersection. Plot follows the same conventions as Figure 4.
Algorithm 4 Sample fast-flux watch-list usage in
Pipeline
FILTER watchlistFromFastFlux








on new connections if, at the time of the first connec-
tion attempt, they would add to a known fast-flux
network. Defenders can effectively cap the viable
size of fast-flux networks, reducing their usefulness
to adversaries.
We can confirm that domains exhibiting parking
on private IP addresses does not likely confound fast-
flux network detection. We can also help explain
why the recent literature uses ‘parking’ to mean
typo-squatting for revenue generation: the older us-
age we study is much less common. Although park-
ing on private IP addresses is rare, it is still an odd
behavior. Further analysis may evidence what these
resources are used for. However, given how long
it takes to detect such parking, it is likely not the
best use of defender resources. This assessment may
change domains parked on private IP address space
are used for high-impact attacks; however, our ob-
servations do not evaluate this concern. Future work
should occasionally re-validate this assessment.
There are possible alternative interpretations of
our parking results. Perhaps adversarial capability
in utilizing parked domains in this way is still in
an early phase of development. Alternatively, the
domains exhibiting this kind of parking may be ma-
licious, but simply are not found by any detection
method used by the blacklists we compare against.
We have presented a combination of surprising re-
sults, on fast-flux, and unsurprising results, on park-
ing. More notable is the importance of the method of
long-term internet measurement in detecting trends
and making conclusions. Passive DNS remains a use-
ful tool, because it supports such long time scales
while still keeping wide coverage feasible. However,
our results also rely on archiving many years of con-
textual data, for routing, blacklists, and Alexa’s top
domains. The providers of these data do not have
much incentive to store and archive long spans of
data. Routeviews and RIPE RIS do a good job col-
lecting this routing information. Similar initiatives
for other internet metadata would improve the com-
munity’s ability to pursue research.
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